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John was also noted for his
numerous contributions to the
discussion of general questions in
evolutionary biology, and for
providing an evolutionary
perspective on other areas of
biology, such as ecology and
development. He was a persistent
critic of group-selectionist
thinking and of the theory of
punctuated equilibrium. He
published fourteen books and
collections of papers on an
astonishing diversity of subjects,
as well as many lucid semi-




and junior colleagues at Sussex
were greatly influenced and
encouraged by him. John was an
entertaining conversationalist,
with a fund of amusing stories
about Haldane and other
prominent figures. His friends and
colleagues will remember him with
deep affection.
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Antonio Damasio is Van Allen
Professor of Neurology and Head
of the Department of Neurology
at The University of Iowa, and
Adjunct Professor at The Salk
Institute. He has worked on
critical problems in the
fundamental neuroscience of
mind and behavior, at the level of
large-scale systems in humans,
but his investigations have also
encompassed parkinsonism and
Alzheimer’s disease. His
contributions have had a major
influence on our understanding of
the neural basis of decision-
making, emotion, language and
memory. He is the author of
several books: Looking for
Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the
Feeling Brain (2003); The Feeling
of What Happens: Body and
Emotion in the Making of
Consciousness (1999); and
Descartes’ Error: Emotion,
Reason, and the Human Brain
(1994).
Do you have a favorite
scientific paper? I have several,
but one does stand out for
personal reasons: Norman
Geschwind’s Disconnection
Syndromes in Animals and Man,
published in Brain in 1965. It is a
long two-part article which turns
out to be a peer-reviewed
monograph in disguise. (It is
difficult to imagine any journal
would publish it today). It dealt
with the relation between
functions such as language and
recognition, and the specialized
systems which support them,
based on human evidence from
neurological patients. At the time
it went further than any previous
effort in the attempt to explain the
neural mechanisms behind the
failures of such functions.
When I read Disconnection
Syndromes I already knew that I
would spend my life studying the
brain — the word neuroscience
was not yet in use — but the
paper changed my direction. I
probably would have become a
neurophysiologist, given that I
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Just discernible between the
lines of Brian Charlesworth’s
informative obituary of John
Maynard Smith is a grand old
enfant terrible in a tradition that
probably cannot be sustained in
the cultural climate of today’s
academic science. It is alleged
that as a visiting distinguished
professor in Chicago he once
danced out of a drunken party
with an unmentionable item of
underwear on his head; but I
wasn’t at the party and cannot
vouch for this. I do know that he
attributed the generous covering
of lichen on the little wall around
the paved area giving onto his
wonderful, loved and admired
garden in the Sussex Downs to
the many generations of
students and colleagues who
stumbled out during parties at
his house to pee on it —
because he told me so. 
This is not just a funny story:
an earthy sense of biological
reality was generally
characteristic and always
informed his approach to theory.
And other things. On his
recovery from surgery for colon
cancer, he remarked that “the
great moment is the first shit,
when you can be sure the
surgeon hasn’t joined the
duodenum up to the inferior
vena cava”. Anatomy was still a
serious subject for serious
biologists in John’s student
days, and J.Z. Young was
among the towering figures
alluded to above (though he
towered at Oxford not UCL).
Not a frightening man, he did
get memorably exasperated by
molecular biologists who
became intoxicated with the
power of new molecular
technology and launched on
rash evolutionary excursions
into territory with which they had
(arguably) insufficient familiarity.
I cannot remember whose
suggestion about evolutionary
bottlenecks was met with an
excoriating remark about the
connection between the necks
of bottles and the quality of the
argument; I can remember
apoplectic outbursts
occasioned by the idea of
molecular drive, which invoked
phenomena in the behaviour of
non-coding DNA to account for
the evolution of complex
structures such as eyes in what
seems to some an otherwise
unaccountably short time.
During an energetic exchange at
a conference on this notion,
some hapless participant asked
the warring parties how they
would distinguish an eye that
had evolved through molecular
drive from one that had evolved
through natural selection. 
“Oh I can tell you that,”
snapped John Maynard Smith,
glaring from behind the thick
lenses of his spectacles, “You
wouldn’t be able to SEE with the
eye that had evolved through
molecular drive.” 
A postscript
was poking brains with needles
by then. Geschwind, however,
made me see that my two real
interests — biology and the
workings of the human mind —
could be combined quite
effectively under the same roof. It
was only a glimpse of a far away
horizon, but the sight was so
attractive that I never looked
back.
If you knew what you know
today, would you still pursue
the same career? I would like to
think so, yes, with some
variations of emphasis and
method. When I began work on
experimental neuropsychology,
modern neuroimaging had not yet
been invented and we relied on
indirect brain measures. It took
some fortitude to keep working
on a field that many regarded as
unfashionable. But I stuck with it
(and so did my wife, Hanna) and
when brain scanners were
invented in short order, we were
ready to use them. I wonder if I
would have had the wisdom — or
guts — to stick to my choice if I
was starting today, in comparable
circumstances.
What is the best advice you
have ever been given? Work on
problems that you really enjoy and
dedicate yourself to questions you
really care to see answered. Don’t
follow fashion. Unfortunately,
more often than not, young
scientists are advised to follow
fashion, go where the money is,
and so forth. Awful advice.
What is your greatest ambition
in research? To contribute to the
comprehensive elucidation of the
biology of emotions and feelings
— which requires linking up
molecular and cellular
mechanisms to larger systems,
connecting them to behavioral
and mental descriptions, and in
turn to social and cultural
phenomena. The task is rather
daunting, and it is not the job for
one single team, let alone a single
person. But given a proper
amount of healthy collaborations I
believe it is doable. The impact
could be enormous, beginning
with a more effective biomedical
management of mental diseases
and ending with biologically
grounded and truly liberating
conceptions of human nature.
The latter could have a major
social and cultural impact. The
effective solution of human
conflicts requires knowledge that
can only come from a better
understanding of the biology of
emotions.
Do you have a scientific hero,
dead or alive? Most of my
scientific heroes are alive,
fortunately, but perhaps I should
not offend their modesty by
naming them (not to mention
irritating those who would not be
named). I do have a dead
scientific hero of sorts: William
James. He did not run
experiments in a lab, of course,
but he was able to isolate
scientific problems with clarity,
propose insightful hypotheses for
the elucidation of the problems,
and debate the merits of a
hypothesis with rigor. He provides
a real model for how to think
scientifically in the complicated
domain of mind and brain.
Do you think it will be possible
to explain the mind in
neurobiological terms, as
William James would no doubt
have wanted? Yes, and not just
possible, but likely, because the
processes of mind are
neurobiological. They are the
most complex of all
neurobiological processes, to be
sure, that being the reason why it
is legitimate to designate them by
special terms such as ‘mental
events’ or ‘mind.’ But everything
indicates that the substance of
the phenomena is biological.
What makes them ‘different’ is
their privacy, the fact that they
are accessible only from the
interior of an organism, from the
neurally constructed entity
otherwise known as ‘the self’. But
in order to see this issue clearly it
is important to adopt conceptions
of consciousness grounded on
the notion of self, something that
is only now beginning to take
place.
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What is a human? Everyone
thinks they know the answer, but
nobody can define the term.
Curiously, systematists have not
defined a ‘type specimen’ for
humans, in contrast to other
species. Recent attempts to
provide a definition for our species,
so-called ‘anatomically modern
humans’, have suffered from the
embarrassment that exceptions to
such definitions inevitably arise —
so are these exceptional people
then not ‘human’? Anyway, in
comparison with our closest-living
relatives, chimpanzees, and in light
of the fossil record, the following
trends have been discerned in the
evolution of modern humans:
increase in brain size; decrease in
skeletal robusticity; decrease in
size of dentition; a shift to bipedal
locomotion; a longer period of
childhood growth and
dependency; increase in lifespan;
and increase in reliance on culture
and technology.
The traditional classification of
humans as Homo sapiens, with our
very own separate family
(Hominidae) goes back to
Linnaeus. Recently, the
controversial suggestion has been
made of lumping humans and
chimpanzees together into at least
the same family, if not the same
genus, based on the fact that they
are 98–99% identical at the
nucleotide sequence level. DNA
sequence similarity is not the only
basis for classification, however: it
has also been proposed that, in a
classification based on
cognitive/mental abilities, humans
would merit their own separate
kingdom, the Psychozoa (which
does have a nice ring to it). 
As for sub-categories, or ‘races’,
of humans, in his Systema Naturae
of 1758 Linnaeus recognized four
principal geographic varieties or
subspecies of humans:
Americanus, Europaeus, Asiaticus,
and Afer (Africans). He defined two
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